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Abstract In this article we explore the ethical issues raised
by permitting patients to pay for participation (P4) in
clinical trials, and discuss whether there are any categorical
objections to this practice. We address key considerations
concerning payment for participation in trials, including
patient autonomy, risk/benefit and justice, taking account
of two previous critiques of the ethics of P4. We conclude
that such trials could be ethical under certain strict condi-
tions, but only if other potential sources of funding have
first been explored or are unavailable.
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Introduction
Imagine that you are suffering from terminal cancer and
you’ve heard about a clinical trial that aims to test a
promising new drug in humans for the first time. You’re
keen to enroll as your current treatment is no longer
effective. On reading the information sheet and consent
form, you are surprised to see that participation in the trial
will cost 20,000 Euros because of the high cost of the drug
involved. Is it ethical to ask and permit patients to pay for
participation (P4) in clinical trials? [P4 medicine is defined
as predictive, preventive, personalized, and participatory
(Hood and Flores 2012); P4 trials could be an important
part of this emerging trend.] Sometimes this is the only
way to secure funding for clinical research, but asking
patients to do this raises important ethical issues. In this
article, we identify and analyze these issues, assess the
ethical acceptability of asking patients to pay for partici-
pation in trials, and discuss whether there are any cate-
gorical objections to this practice, before making several
recommendations regarding the conduct of P4 trials. We
also respond to two previous critiques of P4 by Emanuel
et al. (2015) and Wenner et al. (2015). Our discussion is
relevant to patient payment for any type of clinical trial, but
our focus is on cancer research. Certain specifics in the
analysis regarding payment for participation will vary
according to the disease in question, but the core issues
remain the same.
Autonomy and justice: categorical objections
When faced with the proposal to ask patients to pay for
participation in clinical trials, some people might reflex-
ively react that this is simply unethical, even without
detailed exploration of the relevant issues. There are two
main reasons that might underpin this stance. First, patients
in general are a potentially vulnerable group, and involving
them in research is already ethically challenging even
under normal circumstances. Terminally ill patients are a
particularly vulnerable group, and asking such patients to
contribute considerable sums in exchange for involvement
in research raises serious concerns about autonomy and
exploitation. Under what conditions should an individual
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be judged competent to invest large sums in an uncertain
research enterprise? Furthermore, while some patients are
well-off, others are very poor, and might incur large debts
by borrowing substantial sums in order to participate in a
trial (assuming that they had sufficient collateral to secure a
loan). Emanuel et al. (2015) argue that what they call ‘‘pay
to play’’ trials should be prohibited, in part because of such
considerations:
Pay-to-play research is less likely to be a collabora-
tive partnership than a psychological exploitation of
individuals desperate to do anything to save their own
or a loved one’s life. Although willingness to pay
might indicate understanding and voluntariness by
participants, it might also reveal unrealistic expecta-
tions and undue pressure. The chances for success of
early phase experimental drugs are much smaller than
either researchers or laypeople think. The vast
majority of experimental agents, *90 %, that enter
human trials even under current circumstances fail
primarily for reasons of safety and efficacy.
These are serious concerns, but they are not of a categorical
nature: while it is true that asking for payment may
contribute to the therapeutic misconception, terminally ill
patients are usually judged competent to give consent to
enter a potentially risky clinical trial, and it is not obvious
that adding a fee to the equation changes things funda-
mentally. Furthermore, even if it were shown that P4 trial
participants were more prone to the therapeutic miscon-
ception (where participation in research is mistaken for
involvement in clinical therapy), steps other than prohibi-
tion could be taken to address this. For example, patients
could be informed that 90 % of new drug trials fail, and
reminded very clearly that seeking clinical benefit from
such a trial is likely to be a futile endeavour (see ‘‘Risk,
benefit and trial design’’ section). Taking these extra steps
would address the worry of Emanuel et al. that participants
are ‘‘likely to overestimate the chances of a successful
outcome.’’ Ironically, Emanuel et al. themselves fall victim
to the therapeutic misconception when considering the
social value of P4 trials; they state that ‘‘buying into a
clinical trial ultimately constitutes the purchasing of a good
or service that happens to contribute social value as a side
effect.’’ But this gets things the wrong way round: those
who ‘‘pay to play’’ are paying for participation in a trial
that aims to provide social value through generalisable
knowledge. The goods and services they pay for are
involvement in research, with all its uncertainties; any
benefit to the patient/participant is actually a side effect.
Emanuel et al. also raise concerns about voluntariness:
Desperate patients are likely to feel pressured to pay
for participation, leading to biased decisionmaking
that raises questions about voluntariness…Just
because people can pay—or raise— substantial sums
does not mean they cannot be taken unfair advantage
of, especially if their illness or that of a loved one
compromises or biases their decisionmaking. Typi-
cally, in such circumstances, society protects indi-
viduals from potential abuse.
Once again, Emanuel and colleagues assume, from a
presumption of likely exploitation, that prohibition is the
appropriate response to these concerns—despite the fact
that illness can bias decision-making in any patient
considering participation in a phase 1 trial. The fact that
people are paying for participation does not mean that they
are being taken advantage of, even if the risk of
exploitation is increased. As Emanuel et al. themselves
state, society takes steps to protect individuals from
potential abuse in clinical trials, and these steps might
well be sufficient to prevent any added risk of exploitation
of or bias in potential participants in P4 trials; if they are
not sufficient to this new challenge, these measures could
be extended or enhanced. It is true that asking patients for
payment adds another factor that could increase pressure
on patients, but it is not obvious that prohibition is the
appropriate response to this added factor.
The second objection is that it is simply unjust to ask
anyone to pay for participation in clinical research (even if
they become stakeholders in the research enterprise by
doing so). However, this too is not obviously true, and even
if it were, this might again not be sufficient reason to
prohibit the practice categorically. If patients want to take
part in a research project and the project simply will not be
funded without their participation, it might well be more
unjust to deny them the opportunity to contribute, even if
this raises further issues of justice that we will now turn to.
(It might be argued that it is not unjust to deny patients the
opportunity to pay for participation in research that has
failed to secure funding in the normal way because this
failure is suggestive of lower-quality research. However,
many excellent trials cannot obtain funding, and failure of
market mechanisms alone is not an indicator of a poor
research proposal.)
If it is ethical in terms of individual autonomy and risk
to ask patients to pay for participation in a trial, is it fair to
do so when only well-off patients will be able to afford the
expense? In essence, only the well-off have a chance of
benefitting directly from such a trial (Emanuel et al. 2015).
Some would argue that it would be contrary to principles of
equity to permit such a trial, as it entails complicity of the
research process with preserving certain social advantages
that are not enjoyed by socioeconomically disadvantaged
people; indeed, ‘‘fair participant selection’’ is one of eight
suggested principles for ethical clinical review (Emanuel
D. Shaw et al.
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et al. 2008). The FDA mentions justice concerns in its
overview of the 2009 rule concerning payment for partic-
ipation, though not under the heading of ethical
considerations:
A significant concern (…) relates to the potential
effect on access to investigational therapies for eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals and the unin-
sured. Allowing sponsors to charge could impose a
significant financial burden on many seriously ill
individuals who lack therapeutic alternatives and
could preclude access by some needy patients.
However, in the past, many companies that have
provided investigational drugs for treatment use have
often included assistance programs to cover the costs
for those who could not otherwise afford them. FDA
expects this practice will continue. (FDA 2009)
However, the focus of this passage appears to be on
expanded access outside trials rather than charging
research participants: while pharmaceutical companies do
indeed sometimes provide financial support for compas-
sionate use programmes, such support has not generally
been available in a trial of a very expensive drug where
patients are being asked to pay for participation.
One response to these justice objections would be to
argue that it is fair enough to let well-off people use their
money to participate in a trial, as they are very unlikely to
experience any therapeutic benefit, meaning that poorer
people are not actually any worse off for non-participation
(and indeed may be better off as they don’t need to assume
any of the risk). Indeed, the correct terminology is really
payment for participation in research, not payment for
clinical care or for access to a therapeutic dose of a drug.
Anyone who thinks in the latter terms is a victim of the
therapeutic misconception.
Another response is that future worse-off people who
suffer from the same disease will may well eventually
benefit if these rich people contribute towards paying for a
trial that will not take place unless funds are raised in this
way. This Rawlsian argument is quite persuasive; no-one
will benefit if the trial never goes ahead, but if it is financed
by well-off participants, socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients are quite likely to benefit from any resulting new
drug at some point in the future (though it will probably not
be the same disadvantaged patients who end up benefiting,
but different ones in the future). Would it not be counter-
productive to prohibit this type of research funding
mechanism simply because it represents a short-term dis-
advantage for the worse-off? If the worst-off in society
tend to benefit in the long run, a temporary inequality to
those who cannot afford to participate may be justified [see
Rawls (1999) for more background on the difference
principle].
This argument may invite the practical criticism that, if
the drug in question is so expensive, it is unlikely to be
approved for funding by national health systems and
insurers, meaning that poor people will not in fact be able
to access it. If correct, this would mean that the reason for
asking people to pay to participate in research—the cost of
the drug—could itself mean that the research is rendered
largely irrelevant, as the investigative agent will remain too
expensive to fund even if licensed and mass-produced.
Generally, the potential to provide ‘‘social value’’ is a
requirement for any research, and a drug that will not be
covered by a national health system or an insurer is unli-
kely to meet this criterion. However, having participants
fund trials might actually lead to cheaper outcomes by
circumventing industry: there would be no need for
expensive patents if patients pay for part of the develop-
ment process of drugs. Indeed, another incentive to have
participants pay to join a trial could be a share in the profits
from any resulting drug. Overall, it seems quite likely that
the financial contribution made by well-off participants in
research could yield substantial long-term benefits for
society, including for the worse-off. If the Rawlsian justi-
fication for allowing patients to pay for participation is
regarded as important, an additional criterion for such
studies could be that the drug must at least have a chance of
being cheap enough to be widely funded if it reached the
(less expensive) mass-production stage.
But what if this justice-preserving condition cannot be
met? Some might argue that this Rawlsian justification is
not really required in any case. Why is it unacceptable for
the rich to profit from research that they themselves pay for
without others also profiting in the long run? Can’t they do
as they please with their own money? Given the principles
of contemporary economics (and indeed of capitalism), it
might seem strange to protest against this ‘‘research for and
by the rich’’. The problem with this argument is that a great
deal of public money is invested in the medical research
infrastructures of most countries. While public/private
partnerships are increasingly common, hospitals and doc-
tors tend to be paid for by the state, or at least by mutual
insurance schemes; also, much of the upstream science
upon which the downstream advances are based flows from
publicly-funded research. Allowing rich people preferential
access to clinical trials because of the ability to pay would
be unfair as long as public resources are also involved in
the research. In this argument, only if rich potential par-
ticipants paid for the ‘‘whole show’’ in clinical trials,
including everything from hospital costs to administration
fees to nurses’ and doctors’ salaries, could their paying for
the investigative agent be acceptable.
Another problem occurs at the other end of the financial
scale: is there not a risk that poor people will get them-
selves into serious debt in order to enroll in a paying trial?
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As mentioned above, even rich patients could be in a
vulnerable state and might not be fit to make such a serious
financial decision; for patients living in poverty, loans
might be the only way to raise funds to participate (and
some might not even be able to secure loans). Theoreti-
cally, safeguards could be designed to prevent such situa-
tions arising, but preventing the worst-off from enrolling in
a trial because they had to borrow money to do so raise
further justice concerns.
Finally, it is also worth considering how the identity of
the sponsor could affect the ethics of a P4 trial. While it
might seem problematic for a pharmaceutical company to
seek financial assistance from participants in developing a
drug that it may ultimately profit from, there would pre-
sumably be less concern about a patient advocacy group
acting as a sponsor as its goal would be purely to help
patients.
Risk, benefit and trial design
In addition to concerns regarding autonomy and justice,
subtly different issues of risk and benefit are in play
depending on the type of trial in question. The first issue is
that phase 1 (first-in-human) trials are designed to assess
safety not efficacy. Patients in phase 1 trials are very likely
to receive a sub-therapeutic dose due to the gradual esca-
lation from very low doses throughout the trial (Le Tour-
neau et al. 2009). Most people who paid to take part in such
a trial could not receive any benefit from their involvement,
and (as mentioned above) by asking them to pay,
researchers could further reinforce the therapeutic mis-
conception, putting patients at risk of exploitation. Also, if
the drug in question had low anticipated toxicity and could
easily be tested in healthy volunteers, asking terminally ill
patients to pay to participate in that phase would be an even
more obvious case of exploitation.
Even in modern dose escalation trial designs some
would still receive subclinical amounts of the study drug.
However, it might be regarded as acceptable to let people
pay to participate in a trial if there were a minimum chance
of receiving a potentially therapeutic dose; perhaps 75 %
or higher. This could represent an acceptable compromise
between ‘‘buying benefit’’ in a trial, which is unrealistic,
and the meager ‘‘purchasing participation’’ in research,
which is unlikely to be attractive to those who seek to
access the claimed potential benefits of the drug. Even in
such a trial, though, some patients would pay high amounts
to be used as test subjects with no prospect of benefit.
Moreover, increasing the number of patients exposed to
higher doses also increases the risk of toxicity for each of
them. (In addition, patients would very possibly be giving
up palliative or other drugs of known efficacy to join such a
trial; while this also true of normal phase 1 trials, in this
case they would be paying for the privilege of abandoning
proven treatments.) However, if sufficient safeguards
against the therapeutic misconception were put in place and
the risks explained adequately, there appear to be no con-
clusive arguments against allowing patients to pay to par-
ticipate in a phase 1 trial.
In phase 2/3 trials, all doses would be potentially ther-
apeutic, but another problem occurs unless the study in
question is a single-arm trial: in randomized controlled
trials (RCTs), each patient faces a 50 % chance of being
allocated to the control group. Even if patients in this group
receive the current gold standard drug rather than a pla-
cebo, they will not receive the investigative agent they may
mistakenly believe they are paying to access; what they are
actually paying for is participation in the trial. Patients are
actually less likely to receive the investigative agent in a
phase 2 trial than in a phase 1 trial, even if they are more
likely to receive a potentially therapeutic dose of it. In a
typical phase 1 trial they will all receive the agent, but most
of them at a subtherapeutic dose; in a phase 2/3 RCT, 50 %
will not receive the new drug, but all of those who do
receive it will receive a potentially therapeutic dose. One
possible solution to this problem would be to charge only
those who are randomized to receive the investigative
agent, but this would require unblinding the trial, and this
could compromise the study Of course, the issue of
receiving the control rather than the new drug does not
arise in single-arm phase 2 or 3 studies, where patients are
certain to receive the investigative agent. However,
researchers must be careful avoid any temptation to choose
single-arm over RCT trials in order to increase the attrac-
tiveness of the trial for paying participants in cases where
doing so would be methodologically unsound (Wenner
et al. 2015). Two particular issues arise when we consider
patients paying for participation in single-arm phase 2 tri-
als. First, a study where everyone pays to receive a drug
could be perceived as less fair than a randomised phase 2
trial that is funded by payers but also includes those who
don’t pay, with a 50–50 chance of any one receiving the
active agent. The latter trial would be fairer in terms of
opportunity costs for the less well-off, but less fair overall
in terms of gaining access to the drug. Second, those who
can afford to pay for the drug will presumably come from a
better socioeconomic background, meaning they are more
likely to have led healthier lives; this could potentially
skew outcomes in any trial, but particularly in a single-arm
trial where they are the only participants.
What if trial designs were adapted to address some of
these concerns? In addition to adopting an interparticipant
dose escalation model (which is good practice anyway) it
could be argued that, in certain circumstances like these,
patients willing to pay could also give consent to a phase 1
D. Shaw et al.
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trial where all doses are potentially therapeutic. However,
this raises certain problems. Such a trial would obviously
be more dangerous and be contrary to the principle of
proportionality as all patients would be exposed to a higher
risk of toxicity and side effects (as well as paying for this
added risk). Dose escalation trials might alleviate this
problem to some extent because they allow some degree of
assessment of toxicity and side effects at different dose
levels; using the same doses for everyone would weaken
the evidence generated by the trial. Therefore, those who
move to the therapeutic dose are monitored on the way to
that dose and observed whilst taking it. Similarly, an even
more radical suggestion would be to abandon both ran-
domization and the direct control group in a phase 2 or 3
trial, relying on non-contemporaneous control data (i.e., the
information already gathered about the gold standard
treatment). This would allow everyone paying for access to
the drug to receive it. But again, doing so would weaken
the design of the trial substantially, and perhaps catas-
trophically, given the conventional paradigm that ran-
domised double blind trials are the gold standard.
Weakening the trial in this way would very probably mean
that the second FDA criterion mandating that drugs used in
these trials are both safe and effective was not fulfilled; if
the data obtained in the trial has to be sufficient to establish
that a drug is safe or effective, then the design must be
good enough to ensure that the results are reliable. Aban-
doning accepted best practice in trial design is likely to
offer less convincing evidence. While some trials would
not be able to proceed without using the P4 model and
modifying their design, it might be better not to go ahead if
the trial cannot provide good evidence.
There would also be concerns about recruitment, dis-
continuation and withdrawal in any trial where patients
paid to participate. Even if a trial was approved by an
ethics committee, would it be able to recruit enough
patients? It seems likely that patients would be less inclined
to join such a trial than in the case of a typical trial where
participation is free of charge. This might lead to
researchers being tempted to loosen inclusion criteria to
boost recruitment (although this is true of any trial). On the
other hand, there are many well-off people with cancer—
what if more people want to pay to join the trial than is
scientifically necessary? It is normally regarded as uneth-
ical to recruit more people than required for a clinical trial,
particularly a phase 1 study as it exposes more people to
potential harm than is necessary; doing so also compro-
mises the scientific integrity of the study. Again, variants of
these issues occur in typical clinical trials, but paying
patients may be able to apply more pressure on researchers
than would otherwise be the case. Researchers might well
be more vulnerable to coercion from patients in a P4 trial
because patients feel they have more right to control what
happens in the trial.
Other issues are raised at the other end of trial
involvement. What would happen to patients who paid and
joined the trial, only for the trial to be abandoned because
of low recruitment? Would they be able to keep receiving
the drug outside the trial? Normally they would not, but if
they pay for it they might expect to. Furthermore, would
patients who died during the trial or withdrew from it for
other reasons have their payment refunded? Given that the
drugs would have to be manufactured before the trial
began, we can assume that there would be no refunds.
These concerns could probably be addressed with a well-
designed information sheet and consent form, but they do
deserve careful consideration.
Regulation of P4 trials
Few guidelines on P4 trials have been published. In 2009
the FDA introduced new rules permitting payment for
access to experimental drugs, both within the context of
clinical trials and as ‘‘expanded access’’ or compassionate
use (when patients are prescribed drugs that are not yet
licensed (FDA 2009). The rationale for permitting charging
patients in the context of a trial was that some potentially
beneficial research will simply never be conducted without
funding from this source, due to the great expense of
manufacturing the experimental drug: ‘‘cost recovery is
justified in clinical trials only when necessary to further the
study and development of promising drugs that might
otherwise be lost to the medical armamentarium.’’ There
was very little reaction from the medical or bioethical
community to these new guidelines, despite the fact that
these new regulations permit charging patients for partici-
pation in clinical trials, a practice most infamously asso-
ciated with the exploitative and controversial practices of
the Burzynski Clinic (Szabo 2013). This may be because
the new guideline simply formalized existing FDA practice
(Rossen 2009), but the silence is surprising given the eth-
ical issues raised by this practice. The FDA sets four cri-
teria that must be met in order for patients to be charged for
participation in a trial:
(i) Provide evidence that the drug has a potential
clinical benefit that, if demonstrated in the clinical
investigations, would provide a significant advantage
over available products in the diagnosis, treatment,
mitigation, or prevention of a disease or condition;
(ii) Demonstrate that the data to be obtained from the
clinical trial would be essential to establishing that
the drug is effective or safe for the purpose of
obtaining initial approval of a drug, or would support
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a significant change in the labeling of an approved
drug (e.g., new indication, inclusion of comparative
safety information); and
(iii) Demonstrate that the clinical trial could not be
conducted without charging because the cost of the
drug is extraordinary to the sponsor. The cost may be
extraordinary due to manufacturing complexity,
scarcity of a natural resource, the large quantity of
drug needed (e.g., due to the size or duration of the
trial), or some combination of these or other
extraordinary circumstances (e.g., resources available
to a sponsor). (FDA 2009)
(Interestingly, the fourth criterion, present in an earlier
draft (that the charge must be ‘‘reasonable’’), did not make
it to the final rule.) Essentially, then, any trial in which
patients are to be charged be relevant and well-designed,
and must concern a very expensive drug. Some might
interpret the ‘‘potential clinical benefit’’ criterion as ruling
out most phase 1 P4 trials because they are unlikely to
provide any benefit. However, there is at least a chance in
some such studies of benefit, and the wording ‘‘if
demonstrated in the clinical investigations’’ could also be
interpreted as meaning ‘‘in this or subsequent trials’’.
In addition to these conditions, the FDA acknowledge in
the text of their final rule that charging patients for access
to investigational agents raises ethical issues:
Two comments stated that there are ethical concerns
with charging patients for expanded access use of
investigational drugs that may have no benefit and
pose safety concerns. Response: In determining
whether to permit an expanded access use of an
investigational drug, FDA assesses whether the
potential risks are reasonable in light of the potential
benefits, sometimes on the basis of quite limited
clinical evidence. Therefore, FDA agrees that there is
a risk that the investigational drug will have no
benefit and, therefore, that a patient will pay for an
investigational drug that provides no benefit. How-
ever, if a drug has a potential benefit that is reason-
able in light of the risks associated with the drug, and
the sponsor must charge to make the drug available,
FDA believes the public health is best served by
making the drug available to patients for a fee, even if
the potential benefit is not realized in a given patient.
FDA believes that the ethical concerns expressed in
these comments can be addressed by an informed
consent that accurately reflects the costs, potential
risks, and potential benefits. (FDA 2009)
However, this again refers to expanded access outside the
context of a trial, and the FDA worryingly does not
mention that these ethical issues are also raised by (and are
perhaps even more important in) payment for participation
in a clinical trial.
Emanuel et al. (2015) and Wenner et al. (2015) raise
concerns about current regulation of clinical trials being
insufficient for governance of P4 trials. In addition to the
aforementioned concerns, Emanuel et al. assume that P4
studies would not be peer reviewed: ‘‘Peer reviewers can
evaluate the potential social benefit of research and prioritize
longer-term but more beneficial projects. Pay-to-play fund-
ing would prioritize research needs of the wealthy and their
ailments…pay-to-play research could also skew researchers
and research institutions to pursue lucrative studies that are
not necessarily socially valuable.’’ Similarly, Wenner et al.
echo these concerns and contend that the lack of adequate
oversight would jeopardise trial quality:
In PFTs, patient sponsors are strongly motivated by the
short-term goal of access to new interventions and the
profit motive shifts from the sponsor to PFT clinics,
which generate revenue directly from the enrollment of
participants…This funding model effectively reverses
incentives to minimize sample size and encourages
sponsors to enroll large cohorts. In doing so, it also
increases patient exposure to the risks of unproven
interventions…[In non-P4 trials] the threat of regulatory
disapproval is leveraged to encourage industry sponsors
to utilize ‘‘gold standard’’ methodologies such as
blinding and randomization. Peer review plays a similar
function for publicly funded studies. Although these
mechanisms are imperfect, there is no comparable
means to encourage study quality in the PFT model.
Both sets of authors are clearly heavily influenced by their
North American perspective. In the United States, trials can
be conducted privately without ethics oversight if public
funds are not used. In Europe, by contrast, the clinical trial
regulation sets out rigorous standards for scientific and
ethical review to which all trials must adhere. Any P4 trial
conducted by any private or public entity in Europe would
be subject to the same rules as any traditional trial. This
means that the usual sample size, blinding and random-
ization standards would be consistently applied (and in any
case, it is often the case that more patients than are
necessary for a study want to join it). Consequently, almost
all of these authors’ regulatory concerns are considerably
alleviated in the European context, as illustrated by the
recommendations made by Wenner et al.:
First, policy makers could create a mechanism for
providing scientific and ethical oversight of PFTs.
Second, to encourage the use of such mechanisms in
the absence of larger legal or policy mandates, aca-
demic medical centers, professional organizations,
and licensing boards should discourage their
D. Shaw et al.
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members from participating in studies not approved
via such review. Third, policy makers should con-
sider whether accreditation requirements for health
care facilities could be used to encourage entities
conducting PFTs to utilize an appropriate mechanism
for scientific review and ethical.
In the European Union, the mechanism for providing
scientific and ethical oversight for P4 trials is already in
place in the form of the Clinical Trials Regulation.
Adherence to the requirements of the regulation is a legal
obligation, so there would be no need to discourage
researchers from participating in P4 trials not subject to
these standards. Similarly, there would be no need to use
accreditation to encourage researchers to use oversight
mechanisms required by European law.
Emanuel et al. also suggest that P4 trials raise other new
issues for IRBs. They state that when reviewing a P4 trial,
‘‘the IRB would have to determine whether the potential
direct benefits and knowledge gains from the research justify
the financial losses to participants that are associated with
enrolling in the trial, as well as whether any risks could be
justified if the study might not be able to recruit an adequate
number of paying participants and therefore must be aban-
doned.’’ However, both of these points are mistaken. First, it
is not the role of an IRB toweigh financial loss to participants
against the prospect of societal or personal benefit to the
patient, even if criteria existed that could make any such
weighing valid. Some patients might not be able to afford
such a trial, while for others the cost will be relatively neg-
ligible. But IRBs do not review the financial circumstances
of patients. More importantly, patients in such situations are
contributing to funding the research project, not to funding
clinical benefit for themselves (though thismight not be clear
tot hem). Furthermore, if there is a prospect of societal
benefit, then even a high amount of money might be ‘‘worth
it’’. Just as IRBs should apply the same rigorous ethical and
design standards to P4 trials, they should not let the fact that
patients are helping to fund research distract them from
traditional risk/benefit analysis. Second, IRBs must always
consider for all trials the potential risks of discontinuation
due to recruitment failure. These risks might be higher for P4
trials, but an IRB could adjust its considerations accordingly
and ensure that patients are adequately informed of any such
risk. The only additional information might be to remind
patients that their financial contributions are non-refundable.
Alternative funding mechanisms
Asking patients to pay researchers for participation in trials
is an intriguing yet challenging prospect. However, other
alternatives may have better prospects of success and
ethical acceptability. For example, a variant of the
scheme discussed above would be to set it up so that
wealthy prospective participants could only be admitted to
the trial if they also paid for a worse-off patient to partic-
ipate. This would mitigate the injustice of asking poorer
patients to pay by providing financial assistance to them.
However, setting the thresholds between those who can
join the trial for free, those who must pay for themselves,
and those who must pay for themselves and one (or more?)
other would itself pose some challenges.
Another alternative option is ‘‘crowdfunding’’, via sites
similar in function to Kickstarter. Using such schemes,
online donors from all over the world could contribute to
funding a promising clinical trial in the same way that they
can donate online to charities (McNamee 2014). Experi-
ment.com has successfully crowdfunded hundreds of
research projects, with many of them in medicine and
science. While funding clinical trials in this way is a rel-
atively new idea (Chakradhar 2015), a simple example
illustrates how effective it could be. Let’s imagine (using
quite low and simple numbers for the sake of simplicity)
that we need one million Euros for a clinical trial involving
a very expensive drug. If 100,000 people each gave ten
Euros, that would generate one million, and possibly in a
short space of time. (While such an approach could operate
by appealing to altruistic motives, potential contributors
could also be given the incentive of a share in the profit
from any resulting drug, should the trial be successful.)
This potential solution could fund a trial without directly
encountering the aforementioned issues about worsening
the therapeutic misconception, coercing patients or adapt-
ing designs. This solution offers two main advantages.
First, other people who do not have cancer would at least
have the opportunity to contribute altruistically. And sec-
ond, better-off potential participants are likely to contribute
more to such a scheme than those who want to donate but
are struggling financially (in a parallel to the ‘‘pay for
yourself plus one’’ possibility mentioned above). To take a
hypothetical example, 20 worse-off potential participants
could contribute 1000 Euros each, giving 20,000, 11 very
well off participants could each contribute 20,000, giving a
total of 220,000, and if 78,000 altruistic donors each gave
10, the target would have been reached. Of course,
prospective participants in the trial could themselves take
part in any such crowdfunding scheme, though they would
not have any guarantee that they would be selected for
inclusion in the study.
Although crowdfunding may appear to be a more ele-
gant solution than asking patients to pay, it is not without
potential disadvantages. The most obvious is that some
crowdfunding efforts simply fail to reach their target,
which in this case would mean that the trial could not be
funded in this way. Indeed, even if some trials raised
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enough money via crowdfunding to go ahead, the higher
the number of trials seeking funding, the more likely it is
that any given one will fail to meet its target. Another
concern is that some diseases and types of cancer are easier
to fundraise for than others, meaning that it might be
impossible to use crowdfunding for less well-known dis-
eases like bowel cancer because all the publicity and funds
go to breast and prostate cancer trials. However, if
crowdfunding fails, all other avenues would genuinely be
exhausted and patients could then be asked to pay them-
selves, provided that measures were put in place to address
the aforementioned ethical concerns.
The most realistic solution is likely to be a combination
of crowdfunding and P4. Ideally, crowdfunding will be
attempted first, and hopefully raise sufficient funds for a
trial. However, if insufficient funds are raised, P4 could be
used to raise the remainder of the funds. As well as
enabling the trial to go ahead, this option would also enable
less well-off people who cannot afford to pay to join the
trial, as their places on the trial would be crowdfunded by
the raised funds; the same applies to a fully crowdfunded
trial. (Using initial crowdfunding to enable socioeconom-
ically disadvantaged patients to participate could even be a
regulatory requirement for P4 trials.)
One other possibility would be to ‘‘pay it forward to
play’’. Under any such system, only phase 2, 3 or 4 P4
trials would be permitted, with the funds raised also
contributing towards the costs of future phase 1 trials
(along with funds raised by a tax on licensed new drugs
and some money from the public purse). This would
avoid some of the more challenging ethical issues raised
by asking patients to pay for participation in phase 1 trials
where they are extremely unlikely to get any personal
benefit. In essence, only those with a chance of clinical
benefit would be able to pay for participation, and their
payments would subsidise both their own trial and phase
1 trials for future patients. Ethically, this seems like an
attractive option, but it would take considerable invest-
ment and development to start up. Furthermore, the
aforementioned issues concerning randomization in later-
phase trials might also be problematic.
Conclusion
It is understandable that clinical researchers who want to test
an expensive new drug with impressive results from animal
studies would be very keen to fund their expensive trials with
P4; only a small percentage of potential trials gain funding
despite the very highquality ofmanyof those that are rejected.
It is also understandable that those who have money and a
diagnosis of a disease that has a prognosis that is not good
might want to pay for trials of promising drugs. However,
doing so further heightens existing concerns about the thera-
peuticmisconception and equity. Emanuel et al. conclude that
P4 trials risk ‘‘(1) skewing the types of studies pursued as well
as the amount of time researchers and facilities devote to
particular projects; (2) exploiting potential human subjects;
and (3) compromising the methodological rigor of clinical
studies.’’ However, as we have suggested in our analysis, the
peer and ethical review structures in place in Europe offer
much stronger protections than equivalent mechanisms in the
United States, and P4 trials conducted in the European Union
would be unable to ‘‘slip through the regulatory gap’’ in the
way feared byEmanuel,Wenner and colleagues. Specifically,
research ethics committees can prevent skewing of study
priorities, the risk of exploitation can be avoided with careful
use of existing review and consent mechanisms, and Europe-
based researchers seeking to conduct P4 trials aremandated to
meet normal trial standards. Therefore, under certain very
limitedcircumstances, a carefullydesigned trial could perhaps
recruit paying participants in an ethical way, but any such trial
would have to guard even more than usual against the thera-
peutic misconception and make it clear to patients that they
were paying not for access to a drug, but for participation in
research. We do not recommend abandoning usual dose
escalation protocols or randomization in order to increase the
attractiveness of trials for paying participants, as doing so
could both increase risk to patients and weaken the resulting
evidence. Our main recommendations are summarized in
Table 1. The alternative avenue of crowdfunding clinical
trials represents a more ethically straightforward way of
funding clinical trials of highly expensive investigational
agents, and this option should be explored before asking
Table 1 Recommendations for ethical P4 trials
1. Crowdfunding should generally be explored before a P4 trial is considered, and it may be necessary to combine crowdfunding with P4
2. If the worst-off in society tend to benefit in the long run, a temporary inequality to those who cannot afford to participate in a P4 trial may
be justified
3. Research ethics committees must ensure that the design of trials is not compromised because of their P4 nature; specifically, all current trial
standards regarding blinding, randomization, sample size and dose escalation must be met
4. Extra safeguards against the therapeutic misconception must be put in place: those who ‘‘pay to play’’ are paying for participation in a trial
that aims to provide social value through generalisable knowledge. They are paying for involvement in research, and any potential benefit to
the patient/participant is merely an unlikely side effect
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patients to pay to take part in clinical trials. In most cases a
combination of crowdfunding and P4 may be a more realistic
option.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
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